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INTRODUCTION
Although September 11, 2001, was the starting point of the socalled war on terror, 1 the United States Congress had been attempting
to combat international terrorism long before that unforgettable day. 2
The war on terror has many facets, such as military efforts to capture,
or even kill, known terrorist leaders, as well as foreign policy aimed at
persuading terrorist organizations to seek peace instead of violence. 3
∗

J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Psychology, 2006, University of Wisconsin–Madison. The author
would like to extend her appreciation to Professor Hal Morris and Sandra Stipp for
their guidance in writing this Note. The author would also like to thank Ed, Judy,
and Susan Rowe, as well as Michael Greenspan, for their endless encouragement and
support throughout law school.
1
See Transcript of President Bush’s Address, CNN.com, Sept. 21, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript (“Our war on terror
begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”).
2
See Jennifer A. Rosenfeld, Note, The Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Bringing
International Terrorists to Justice the American Way, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 726, 727–28 (1992).
3
See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 10–11, 23 (2006),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/NSCT0906.pdf.
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But perhaps one of the most important and effective means of stopping
terrorism is to cut off or significantly impair vital sources of funding. 4
Throughout the 1990s, Congress passed a series of laws aimed at
doing just that. One of the most surprising components of the counterterrorism legislation is 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which enables private
citizens injured by an act of international terrorism to sue for treble
damages in federal court. 5 Because Congress intended to enable
private parties to attack terrorist funding through these civil suits,
Congress created yet another tool for eliminating terrorism in general. 6
While countless definitions of terrorism exist, 7 the concept is
exceedingly difficult to define—in part because what is considered as
terrorism 8 has evolved over 2000 years. 9 By some accounts, the only
4

See id. at 12.
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006).
6
See Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 728.
7
The concept of terrorism has been defined in many ways, even among various
United States agencies. See, e.g., ALEX P. SCHMID & ALBERT J. JONGMAN,
POLITICAL TERRORISM: A NEW GUIDE TO ACTORS, AUTHORS, CONCEPTS, DATA
BASES, THEORIES, AND LITERATURE 5–6 (1988) (identifying 109 definitions of
terrorism encompassing twenty-two definitional elements); Louis René Beres, The
Meaning of Terrorism—Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications, 28
VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 239 (1995) (discussing several definitions of
terrorism and their associated infirmities).
8
The term terrorism was first used around the time of the French Revolution,
the regime de la terreur, in the late eighteenth century. MARK BURGESS, CENTER FOR
DEFENSE INFORMATION, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TERRORISM (July 3, 2003),
http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1502; see also
RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT TERROR WAR xviii–xiv (2003).
9
Burgess, supra note 8. Interestingly, two of the earliest historical occurrences
of terrorism were perpetrated by Muslims and Jews, though not against each other.
See id. The Sicari and the Zealots were active Jewish terrorist groups during the
Roman occupation of the first century Middle East. Id. The Sicari mainly targeted
other Jews who they believed had renounced their religious faith, while the Zealots
murdered Romans and Greeks to “send a message” to Roman authorities and their
collaborators. Id. The Assassins—“an 11th century offshoot of a Shia Muslim sect
known as the Ismailis”—stabbed in broad daylight “politicians or clerics who
refused to adopt the purified version of Islam they were forcibly spreading.” Id. As
with the Sicari and the Zealots, the Assassins used their violence as a means of
sending a message—often carrying out their attacks on religious holy days in an
5
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generally agreed-upon characteristic of terrorism is that it involves
violence or the threat of violence. 10 Yet, this cannot be the sole
defining feature of terrorism, because “war, coercive diplomacy, and
barroom brawls” also involve violence and the threat of violence. 11
Thus, as one expert has explained, terrorism may be best defined by
looking at instances that have been, or could be, commonly accepted
as constituting terrorism. 12 As another expert puts it, “[w]e know a
terrorist act when we see one.” 13
While terrorism has existed for millennia in many forms
throughout the world, including in the United States, a background on
Islamic terrorist groups 14 in the Middle East region is of particular
relevance to this Note. 15 One prominent Islamic terrorist group is
effort to “publicize their cause and incite others to it.” Id. In addition to these Jewish
and Muslim groups, another early example of terrorism was the Thugees, an Indian
religious cult that ritually strangled random travelers as an offering to the Hindu
goddess of terror and destruction, who were active during the seventeenth through
the mid-nineteenth centuries. Id. The Thugees may have been the last religiously
inspired terrorist group until that phenomenon reemerged in the past two or three
decades. Id.
10
WALTER LAQUEUR, THE NEW TERRORISM: FANATICISM AND THE ARMS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION 6 (1999).
11
JEFFREY RECORD, STRATEGIC STUDIES INST., BOUNDING THE GLOBAL WAR
ON TERRORISM 6 (2003), available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/Display.Cfm?pubID=207.
12
Burgess, supra note 8.
13
RECORD, supra note 11, at 9.
14
Although radical religious-based terrorist groups operating in the Middle
East may be classified using any number of terms, this Note will refer to them as
Islamic terrorist groups or organizations. See Eli Berman & David D. Laitin,
Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model 7–10 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13725, 2008), available at
http://econ.ucsd.edu/~elib/tc.pdf.
15
Despite this Note’s focus on Islamic terrorist groups, it should be stressed
that terrorism is by no means a phenomenon confined to those of the Islamic faith or
even the Middle East region. To the contrary, terrorist groups have existed in every
region of the world, and religiously affiliated terrorist groups have been based on a
variety of different religions. See Burgess, supra note 8 (discussing terrorist or
terrorist-like regimes in France, Russia, Ireland, various African nations, and the
United States, among others); see also supra note 9. Further, simply because some
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Hamas, 16 which emerged from the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood
in 1987 at the start of the First Intifada, a mass Palestinian uprising
against Israeli control in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. 17
Hamas has political, humanitarian, and “military” (terrorist)
branches. 18 The organization refuses to recognize the State of Israel,
and the terrorist branch carries out suicide bombings, rocket
launchings, and ground attacks in Israeli territories to achieve its goal
of eliminating the Israeli state. 19 Hamas generally recruits its terrorists
by targeting deeply religious young men who have an intense hatred of
Israel. After a suicide bomber dies, Hamas offers his family between
Islamic terrorist groups engage in abhorrent violence by no means implies that all
Muslims do so, or even that they support terrorism. The reality is quite the contrary.
For a vast collection of American Muslims’ condemnations of terrorism postSeptember 11th, see COUNCIL ON AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS, RESPONSE TO
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS (Mar. 28, 2007),
http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/September_11_statements.pdf.
16
Hamas was designated as a terrorist organization by President Clinton in
1995, pursuant to Executive Order 12,947. Exec. Order 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079,
5081 (Jan. 25, 1995) (listing a dozen “terrorist organizations which threaten to
disrupt the Middle East peace process”). Hamas was later designated as a “foreign
terrorist organization” (FTO) in 1997 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189, which created a
procedure by which the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Attorney General, may designate an organization as an FTO. Hamas is now also on
the list of Specially Designated Terrorists and Specially Designated Global
Terrorists. See Alphabetical List of Blocked Persons, Specially Designated
Nationals, SDTs, SDGTs, Foreign Terrorist Organizations & Specially Designated
Narcotics Traffickers, 31 C.F.R. Ch. V, App. A (2008). This list was created after
the September 11th terrorist attacks when President George W. Bush signed
Executive Order 13,224. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,089 (Sept. 23,
2001).
17
See Council on Foreign Relations, Hamas (Jan. 7, 2009),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968. But see Berman & Laitin, supra note 14, at 7
(citing 1988 as the founding date of Hamas).
18
See Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 17. Hamas’s military branch is
known as the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade. Id.
19
See id. Hamas’s “founding charter commits the group to the destruction of
Israel, the replacement of the [Palestinian Authority] with an Islamist state on the
West Bank and Gaza, and to raising ‘the banner of Allah over every inch of
Palestine.’” Id.
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three and five thousand dollars and “assures them their son died a
martyr in holy jihad.” 20
Hamas won the Palestinian Authority’s general election in 2006,
becoming “the largest and most influential Palestinian militant
movement.” 21 The group’s humanitarian wing funds schools,
orphanages, hospitals and other medical facilities, and even sports
leagues; Hamas’s social services work has led to its increased
popularity and, in part, likely explains its rise to political power. 22
Much of Hamas’s funding comes from private donors in oil-rich
Persian Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, as well as from Muslim
charities in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe that
“funnel money into Hamas-backed social service groups.” 23
In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit confronted the harsh realities of terrorism in a case of first
impression in Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute (Boim I). There the
parents of David Boim, a teenage U.S. citizen who was killed in Israel
during an alleged Hamas attack, sued several organizations under 18
U.S.C. § 2333 for purportedly providing financial contributions to
Hamas. 24 The Boim I panel revisited the case in 2007 (Boim II); 25 in
2008, the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en banc, and issued what is
likely to be its final opinion in this case (Boim III). 26 However, given
the increasing effects of international terrorism on American citizens,
courts throughout the country are, unfortunately, quite likely to see a
growing number of § 2333 cases in the near future. In fact, the
Supreme Court of the United States may even speak to this scarcely
20

Id.
See id.
22
See id.
23
Id.
24
See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1001, 1003 (7th Cir.
2002) [hereinafter Boim I].
25
See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816,
05-1821, 05-1822, at 4 (7th Cir. 2007),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf. [hereinafter Boim II].
26
See 549 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) [hereinafter Boim III].
21
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addressed civil statute, 27 as some of the parties to the Boim litigation
have filed petitions for a writ of certiorari. 28
Given the relevance of § 2333, it is important to understand its
overall context and to determine the most legally sound framework of
liability under this civil statute—particularly as it relates to holding
financiers of terrorism liable, as in the Boim litigation. 29 Accordingly,
Part I of this Note provides an overview, including the history and
purpose, of the anti-terrorism statutory scheme. Part II discusses the
facts, legal theories, and procedural history of the Boim litigation,
which is seen by other courts as the “critical authority” on § 2333. 30
Part III addresses two distinct frameworks of liability under § 2333 by
reviewing the Boim III majority opinion, written by Judge Posner, and
one of the dissenting opinions, written by Judge Rovner. Finally, by
analyzing the infirmities of both judges’ opinions, Part IV develops a
legally sound framework for other courts—including the Supreme
Court, if applicable—to adopt when addressing § 2333 donor liability
cases.
I.

THE ANTI-TERRORISM STATUTORY SCHEME

Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, Congress enacted a
patchwork of legislation aimed at combating terrorism by creating
both criminal and civil liability. First, the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 31
27

See Peter M. Mansfield, Terrorism and a Civil Cause of Action: Boim,
Ungar, and Joint Torts, 3 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L., at *33 (2003),
http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/articles/spring2003/Peter%20M.%20Mansfield.doc.
28
See Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S.
May 1, 2009) (No. 08-1441).
29
See, e.g., Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1003–04.
30
Brief of Appellee at 17, Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., Nos.
05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822 (7th Cir. 2007),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf. [hereinafter Brief of Appellee]
(asserting that, as of 2005, Boim I had been followed by at least forty-four other
courts in interpreting § 2333).
31
Pub. L. No. 101-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2250 (1990). This entire Act was
repealed in 1991 because of a “technical deficiency.” See Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000,
1008 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002); 137 CONG. REC. S4511-04 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1991)
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(the Act), codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 2333, provides a civil cause
of action to American victims of international terrorism:
Any national of the United States injured in his or her
person, property, or business by reason of an act of
international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or
heirs, may sue therefore in any appropriate district court of
the United States and shall recover threefold the damages
he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including
attorney’s fees. 32
The Act defines the term “international terrorism” in § 2331(1) as
activities that:
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of
any State. . .;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation
or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination
or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of
the means by which they are accomplished. . . 33
The legislative history of §§ 2331 and 2333 “evidences an intent
by Congress to codify general common law tort principles and to
extend civil liability for acts of international terrorism to the full

(statement of Sen. Grassley) (noting that the Act had been inadvertently enacted
“[d]ue to an enrolling error”). In 1992, however, the provisions of the Act were
reenacted as part of the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992). See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1008 n.6.
32
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006).
33
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2000). Section 2331(1) was amended by the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001)
(amending § 2331(1)(B)(iii) to read “to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”) (emphasis added).
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reaches of traditional tort law.” 34 In addition, as the Seventh Circuit
noted in Boim I, “[t]he statute clearly is meant to reach beyond those
persons who themselves commit the violent act that directly causes the
injury.” 35 Furthermore, the Senate’s Report states that these provisions
“and the imposition of liability at any point along the causal chain of
terrorism. . .interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of money.” 36 Thus,
the Act’s legislative history also indicates quite clearly that the purpose
of § 2333 was to cut off, or significantly impair, vital sources of
terrorist funding by allowing terrorism victims and their families to
pursue private actions to recover for their injuries. To illustrate, at a
Senate hearing on the legislation, Joseph Morris, General Counsel to
the United States Information Agency, stated: “[A]nything that could
be done to deter money-raising in the United States, money laundering
in the United States, the repose of assets in the United States, and so
on, would not only help benefit victims, but would also help deter
terrorism.” 37
The “criminal counterparts” 38 to the civil provisions of the Act
were added in 1994 and 1996, when Congress enacted 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2339A and 2339B, respectively. 39 In relevant part, § 2339A
34

Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1010 (citing 137 CONG. REC. S4511-04 (statement of
Sen. Grassley)); Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Administrative Practice of Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 136 (1990)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Joseph Morris, General Counsel, United
States Information Agency).
35
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1011.
36
S. REP. NO. 102-342, at 22 (1992) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
37
Senate Hearing, supra note 34, at 79; see also id. at 17 (statement of Alan
Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State) (“The existence of such a
cause of action. . .may deter terrorist groups from maintaining assets in the United
States, from benefitting from investments in the U.S., and from soliciting funds
within the U.S.”).
38
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1012.
39
See Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XII, § 120005(a), 108 Stat. 2022 (1994)
(§ 2339A); Pub. L. No. 104-132, Title III, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 1250 (1996)
(§ 2339B). Section 2339C is an additional criminal component in this statutory
scheme that criminalizes the financing of terrorism “by any means, directly or
indirectly,” if the financing is provided with the intent or knowledge that the funds
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criminalizes “provid[ing] material support or resources [to
terrorists]. . ., knowing or intending that they are to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of” a number of violent
crimes, 40 including 18 U.S.C. § 2332, which criminalizes the killing
of, or the attempting or conspiring to kill, a United States national
outside the United States. 41 Section 2339B extends criminal liability to
anyone who “knowingly provides material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts to do so.” 42 Furthermore,
§ 2339A defines “material support or resources” to include the
provision of currency or financial securities, as well as training,

are to be used for carrying out an “act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a civilian. . .” See 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1) (2006). However, § 2339C is
beyond the scope of this Note, as it was enacted years after David Boim’s death and,
thus, was not relevant to the Boim litigation. See Pub. L. No. 107-197, Title II,
§ 202(a), 116 Stat. 724 (2002); Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting
that David Boim was killed in 1996). Nevertheless, when §§ 2339A and 2339B are
referenced throughout the remainder of this Note, § 2339C is implicitly included, as
well.
40
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006). Despite the disjunctive “or” in § 2339A(a)
(“knowing or intending”), courts have interpreted this language as requiring intent.
See Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (C.D. Cal.
2005), aff’d, Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009);
see also Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
41
18 U.S.C. § 2332(a)–(b) (2006). In addition to criminalizing the knowing or
intentional provision of material support or resources with respect to killing a United
States national outside the United States, § 2339A also criminalizes this conduct
with respect to thirty other violent crimes associated with terrorism. See id. § 2339A;
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1013 n.11 (listing the “diverse and extensive list” of crimes
covered by § 2339A).
42
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). The term “foreign terrorist organization” is
defined according to the lengthy provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006). In
2004, § 2339B(a)(1) was amended by adding the following: “To violate this
paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated
terrorist organization. . ., that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist
activity. . ., or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism. . .” By
adding this amendment, Congress clarified that criminal liability attaches as long as
the defendant had knowledge of any one of the three possible characteristics of the
donee organization. See Humanitarian Law Project, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
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facilities, weapons, and “other physical assets, except medicine or
religious materials.” 43
II. THE BOIM LITIGATION: A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION
A. Facts
In 1996, David Boim, a Jewish teenager who was both a United
States and an Israeli citizen, was attending high school in Israel. 44 In
May of that year, as David and some of his classmates were waiting at
a bus stop near Jerusalem, a car pulled off the road, stopping a short
distance away from the group of students. 45 One or more of the car’s
occupants opened fire; David was shot in the head, and died within
hours. 46 David’s murder was later attributed to two alleged members
of the terrorist wing of Hamas. 47
In an effort to keep “even one nickel” from Hamas that might be
used for terrorist acts like the one that took David’s life, 48 David’s
parents, Joyce and Stanley Boim, filed suit in 2000 pursuant to

43

18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b). Section 2339B also adopts this definition of “material
support or resources.” For a discussion of whether some of the activities included in
this definition are void for vagueness, see generally Humanitarian Law Project, 552
F.3d 916.
44
Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2008); Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 051816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 4 (7th Cir. 2007),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf..
45
Boim II, at 5.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 5–6. Whether the Boims had proven that Hamas was, in fact,
responsible for David’s death was contested throughout the Boim litigation, except
as to two defendants who conceded that Hamas was responsible. See Boim v.
Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding a sufficient
factual basis for determining that Hamas was responsible for the attack); see also
Boim II, at 77–78 (vacating the district court’s judgment with respect to one
defendant on the basis that the court, sua sponte, determined that Hamas was
responsible for David’s murder).
48
Boim II, at 7.
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§ 2333. 49 In that civil action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, the Boims named as defendants not only
Amjad Hinawi and Khalil Tawfiq Al-Sharif—the two men allegedly
responsible for David’s death 50 —but also several individuals and nonprofit organizations with alleged ties to Hamas. 51
Two of the named organizational defendants were the Holy Land
Foundation (HLF) and the Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI), which the
Boims claimed are the main fronts for Hamas in the United States, and
whose “allegedly humanitarian functions mask their core mission of
raising and funneling money and other resources to Hamas operatives
in support of terrorist activities.” 52 Specifically, the Boims alleged that
because it is illegal to provide financial support to foreign terrorist
organizations, the money they provide “flows through a series of
complicated transactions, changing hands a number of times, and
being commingled with funds from the front organizations’ legitimate
charitable and business dealings.” 53
Defendant HLF adamantly maintains that it is one of the most
prominent relief organizations serving the humanitarian needs of the
Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 54 In fact, a
significant portion of the funds that HLF allegedly provided to Hamas
was actually given to various charitable entities that are controlled by
Hamas, such as a hospital in Gaza. 55 Nevertheless, its executive
director admitted to being a Hamas activist and that some of HLF’s
money was channeled to Hamas. 56 In December 2001, HLF was added
to the U.S. government’s “Specially Designated Terrorist” list, 57
resulting in the issuance of a blocking order freezing HLF’s assets and
49

Boim III, 549 F.3d at 687; Boim II, at 7.
Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 2002).
51
Boim II, at 7.
52
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1003.
53
Id. at 1004.
54
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 896 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
55
Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 706 (7th Cir. 2008).
56
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1003; Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
57
See discussion supra note 16.
50
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accounts. 58 HLF challenged this administrative designation and
blocking order on various statutory and constitutional grounds in the
District Court for the District of Columbia, but the district court found
substantial support for the designation. 59 On appeal, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, noting that the
record evidence established that “HLF’s role in the funding of Hamas
and of its terrorist activities is incontrovertible.” 60
Defendant QLI is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation that
translates and publishes sacred Islamic texts. 61 Two of QLI’s
principals claim that “QLI’s major undertaking and central purpose is
the ‘Quran Project,’ ‘an entirely new translation of the Quran, based
on a careful and scholarly review and analysis of every single word of
[its] more than 6200 verses.’” 62 The Boims alleged that, regardless of
any claimed legitimate purpose, QLI also knowingly provided, and
aided and abetted others in providing, material support to Hamas. 63
The American Muslim Society (AMS) and the Islamic
Association for Palestine (IAP), two other named defendants, were
also alleged fronts for Hamas. 64 AMS and IAP are, apparently, alter
58

See Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 74
(D.D.C. 2002).
60
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C.
Cir. 2003). It should also be noted that in 2004, the United States government
indicted HLF and several of its principals for, among several other crimes, providing
and conspiring to provide material support to Hamas, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(a)(1). See Boim II, at 9. In November of 2008, HLF and its principals were
found guilty of these charges. United States v. Holy Land Found. For Relief & Dev.,
No. 3:04-CR-240-P (N.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2008), 2008 WL 5240652 (jury verdict).
61
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1003.
62
Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
63
Id. An in-depth FBI investigation of QLI led to the initiation of a civil
forfeiture action, whereby the United States successfully seized funds that QLI had
“transferred to financial institutions within the United States from abroad with the
intent to support the international terrorist activities of the HAMAS organization in
violation of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.” See United States v. One
1997 E35 Ford Van, 50 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (citation omitted).
64
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
59
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egos 65 and were considered to be essentially one entity throughout the
majority of the litigation. 66 The ostensible purpose of AMS is
“advancing a just, comprehensive, and eternal solution to the cause of
the Palestine [sic] people through political, social, and educational
efforts.” 67 Nevertheless, the Boims alleged that AMS provided various
types of support and resources to Hamas; for example, AMS
participated in a 1993 meeting, during which FBI surveillance
revealed that the attendees discussed with Hamas officials various
ways of continuing their support for Hamas. 68 Likewise, AMS invited
pro-Hamas speakers to participate in their annual conferences, one
which “featured a veiled Hamas terrorist as a guest speaker.” 69 The
Boims also alleged that AMS provided financial support to Hamas by
funneling money to HLF which, in turn, provided funds to Hamas. 70
Finally, the Boims named as a defendant Mohammed Abdul
Hamid Khalil Salah, who is allegedly the admitted U.S.-based leader
of Hamas’s terrorist wing. 71 Salah was nominally employed by QLI as
a computer analyst from the late 1980s through 1993. 72 In January

65

Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 687–88 (7th Cir. 2008).
See Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 9 (7th Cir. 2007),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.; Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 906
(noting that IAP and AMS “joined forces” in both their Answer to the Complaint and
their joint motion for summary judgment). Accordingly, AMS and IAP will be
referred to jointly as “AMS” throughout this Note.
67
Boim II, at 9.
68
See id. at 50.
69
Id. at 51.
70
Id. at 9.
71
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1006 (N.D. Ill.
2001). There were also several other defendants who, for various reasons, were no
longer part of the Boim III appeal and decision. See Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 891–
92.
72
Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 927. QLI alleged that Salah was not actually an
employee, but rather only a volunteer. Id. However, QLI admitted that it had
arranged for Salah to receive a $3,000 monthly payment from Yassin Kadi, “who
QLI characterizes as a ‘Saudi Arabian philanthropist.’” Id. As the district court
noted, “[a]t least since October 12, 2001, the United States government has
66
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1993, the Israeli government arrested and charged Salah with being an
active member of and performing services for Hamas, among other
things; Salah pleaded guilty to these charges, and was incarcerated in
Israel until November 1997. 73 During Salah’s incarceration, he
admitted in a handwritten statement to other prisoners that he had
channeled money for Hamas operations. 74 Additionally, the United
States government added Salah to its Specially Designated Terrorist
list 75 in 1995. 76 Salah returned to the United States in 1997, after he
was released from Israeli custody. 77
B. Theories of Liability and Procedural History
The four organizational defendants and Salah moved to dismiss
the Boims’ complaint, arguing that the Boims’ claim sought to impose
aiding and abetting liability, which was not a basis for liability under
§ 2333. 78 In other words, the defendants claimed that, even if they had
provided financial or other support to Hamas, they could not be held
characterized Mr. Kadi quite differently: as of that date, he is a ‘Specially
Designated Terrorist.’” Id. at 927 n.9.
73
Boim II, at 7–8; Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 917–18.
74
Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 918, 920.
75
See discussion supra note 16.
76
Boim II, at 8.
77
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1006 (N.D. Ill.
2001). The United States also seized funds and assets belonging to Salah in the same
civil forfeiture proceeding brought against QLI. See discussion supra note 63.
Furthermore, in 2004, a federal grand jury indicted Salah for: (1) violating the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d);
(2) knowingly providing and attempting to provide material support and resources to
Hamas, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; and (3) attempting to obstructing justice
by giving false and misleading answers to interrogatories posted by the Boims in the
Boim litigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. See Boim II, 511 F.3d at 8. The
United States government dropped the § 2339B charge before trial, and in February
2007, a jury acquitted Salah of the RICO charge; however, the jury did convict him
of the obstruction of justice charge. See id. In July 2007, Salah was sentenced to
twenty-one months in prison. See id.
78
Boim, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1010.
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civilly liable for David’s murder. 79 In January 2001, the district court
denied the motions, holding that § 2333 permitted a cause of action
based on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. 80 The district
court’s rationale for its ruling was based almost exclusively on
statutory interpretation, as there was literally no precedent involving
§ 2333 claims—let alone those against alleged financiers of
terrorism. 81 The following month, at the request of QLI and HLF, the
district court certified three questions for interlocutory appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b):
(1) does funding, simpliciter, of an international terrorist
organization constitute an act of terrorism under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331?;
(2) does 18 U.S.C. § 2333 incorporate the definitions of
international terrorism found in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and
2339B?; and

79

See Boim II, at 11 (“[W]hat has been vigorously disputed from the inception
of this litigation is whether and under what circumstances persons and groups who
allegedly have provided money and other support to Hamas (directly and indirectly)
may also be liable for David’s murder.”).
80
Boim, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
81
See id. at 1011–29. After Boim was initially filed, and throughout its lengthy
stay in the district court and the Seventh Circuit, other cases were brought under
§ 2333; however, the plaintiffs in the majority of these cases sued the terrorist
organizations themselves, as well as the foreign governments who had allegedly
allowed or supported terrorist activities occurring in their jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 315 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D.R.I. 2004), aff’d sub
nom. Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 1034 (2005); Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t. Auth., 310 F. Supp.
2d 172 (D.D.C. 2004); Knox v. Palestine Liberation Org., 306 F. Supp. 2d 424
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). In 2005, a group of United States citizens and family members of
individuals who were victims of Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel brought a § 2333
action against a Jordanian bank; the plaintiffs claimed that the bank had provided
material support to Hamas, as well as charities that it knew were merely fronts for
Hamas, by acting as the exclusive administrator responsible for paying the families
of suicide bombers. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575–78
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). This case is currently in the pre-trial stages.
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(3) does a civil cause of action lie under 18 U.S.C. § 2331
and 18 U.S.C. § 2333 for aiding and abetting international
terrorism? 82
Judges Rovner, Wood, and Evans heard the appeal, and in a case
of first impression, 83 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, answering in the negative
to the first certified question, but in the affirmative to the second and
third certified questions. 84
The case then proceeded through discovery in the district court,
after which each defendant moved for summary judgment, and the
Boims cross-moved for partial summary judgment, though only on the
issue of liability and not with respect to QLI. 85 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Boims as to the liability of
HLF, AMS, and Salah. 86 Because the district court held that there were
genuine issues of material fact existing in the claim against QLI, the
court denied summary judgment as to that defendant, 87 and the case
went before a jury on the issues of QLI’s liability and the amount of
damages to be awarded from all the liable defendants. 88 After a oneweek trial, a jury found QLI liable under § 2333, and assed $52
million in damages against all the defendants, jointly and severally.89
Pursuant to § 2333, the judge then trebled the damages—totaling $156
million—and awarded attorneys’ fees. 90
82

Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., No. 00 C 2905 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2001).
See Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1001 (7th Cir. 2002) (“In this interlocutory
appeal, we are asked to consider the viability of a claim brought under the nevertested 18 U.S.C. § 2333.”); id. at 1009 (“No court has yet considered the meaning
and scope of sections 2331 and 2333, and so we write upon a tabula rasa.”).
84
See id. at 1001, 1011, 1015, 1021.
85
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 892, 894 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
86
Id. at 931.
87
See id. at 929–31.
88
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., No. 00 C 2905, 2005 WL 433463, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2005); see Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
89
Boim, 2005 WL 433463 at *2.
90
Id.
83
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It is worth noting—even if only for its novelty—the rather odd
actions (or lack thereof) on the part of the defendants and their
attorneys at trial. First, HLF’s attorney informed the court that it had
“elected not to participate in—or even attend—the liability phase of
the trial” because of the court’s prior ruling on summary judgment,
and because its assets were already seized and frozen by the United
States government. 91 Counsel for AMS and Salah subsequently
followed suit. 92 Although counsel for all three of these defendants
notified the court that they might attend and participate in the damages
phase of the trial, “none of them did.” 93 Second, after the court denied
QLI’s motion for summary judgment, QLI’s counsel moved for a
continuance of the trial date, claiming that, “because his client was a
relatively minor player,” he had intended to “ride the coattails of the
other defendants’ defenses.” 94 However, when the other defendants’
liabilities were decided on summary judgment, and because they had
elected not to participate in the trial, QLI’s attorney argued that “he
could not reasonably be expected to carry the ball on his own without
being given several more months to prepare.” 95 After the court denied
the motion, 96 QLI’s attorney moved to withdraw from the case; this
motion was also denied, “as it was quite clearly a backdoor attempt to
push back the trial date.” 97 Finally, on the morning of trial, QLI filed a
“Notice of Non-Participation,” informing the court that QLI and its
counsel would attend the trial, but would not actively participate. 98
91

Id. at *1.
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
The court’s reason for denying the motion was: “given that the trial date had
been set for at least six months, and given that the Boims had moved for summary
judgment against all of the defendants except QLI, [its counsel] had ample notice
that he might be the sole defendant to survive to trial.” Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at *2. The magistrate judge presiding in front of the trial advised QLI’s
counsel and its principal that it believed this plan was “both risky and foolish,” and
that it was QLI’s counsel’s responsibility to defend QLI—not the court’s. Id. They
92
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Accordingly, at trial, QLI’s counsel declined to participate in jury
selection; make an opening statement; cross-examine witnesses; object
to the admission of exhibits; make a closing argument; and participate
in the jury instruction conference. 99 Perhaps even more shockingly,
after the jury found QLI liable and awarded damages to the Boims,
QLI filed a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law—or, in the
alternative, a new trial. 100 The court aptly denied these motions,
explaining that “it is hard to believe that these defendants would
actually expect the Court to conduct another trial when they did not
even bother to show up for the first trial.” 101
After this series of events, the defendants again appealed to the
Seventh Circuit, where the case was heard by the same panel of judges
that heard the interlocutory appeal—Judges Rovner, Wood, and
Evans. 102 In an opinion written by Judge Rovner, the panel vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the district court to reassess
liability. 103 Judge Evans concurred with the court’s reversal as to HLF,
but otherwise dissented. 104 The Seventh Circuit then granted the
Boims’ petition for rehearing en banc, vacating the panel’s decision. 105
III. BOIM: THE EN BANC OPINION
On rehearing en banc, the court affirmed the district court’s
judgment in part, and reversed and remanded in part. 106 The en banc
majority opinion was written by Judge Posner. 107 Judge Rovner filed
carried on as planned, however, because they were “determined not to participate in
the trial.” Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at *6.
102
Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 1 (7th Cir. 2007),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf..
103
Id. at 91–93.
104
Id. at 94.
105
Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2008).
106
Id. at 705.
107
Id. at 687.
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an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which she was
joined by Judge Williams and joined in part by Judge Wood. 108
Likewise, Judge Wood filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which she was joined in part by Judges Rovner
and Williams. 109 Judges Rovner, Wood, and Williams were all
generally in agreement as to the legal standards of liability under
§ 2333 of the Act—which were, in some respects, quite different than
those outlined by the majority. 110 In the end, the only issue the full
court agreed upon was that the judgment as to HLF should be reversed
and remanded, because the court disagreed with the district court’s
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 111
This Part separately addresses the Boim III en banc majority
opinion written by Judge Posner and the dissenting opinion 112 written
by Judge Rovner. 113 Although there were various other issues dividing
the court that were important to the Boims’ case, this Part focuses on
the issues which will most profoundly affect future courts’ analyses of
similar cases: (1) whether § 2333 provides for primary or secondary
liability; and (2) the elements required to prove liability against a
donor or supporter of terrorism under § 2333.

108

See id. at 705, 705 n.1.
See id. at 719, 719 n.1.
110
Compare, e.g., id. at 689, 693, with id. at 708, 712.
111
See id. at 706, 719–20. For a thorough discussion of why HLF could not be
held liable based on collateral estoppel, see Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 051821, 05-1822, at 22–48 (7th Cir. 2007),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf..
112
Although Judge Rovner’s and Judge Wood’s opinions were opinions
“concurring in part and dissenting in part,” the only holding with which Judges
Rovner, Wood, and Williams concurred was that the district court improperly
applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to HLF. See id. at 706; id. at 719–20.
Therefore, these opinions will be referred to simply as dissenting opinions.
113
Because the two opinions written by Judge Rovner and Judge Wood
basically espouse the same analysis and reasoning, but because Judge Rovner
authored the two previous panel opinions, this Part focuses on their analysis as
illustrated in Judge Rovner’s opinion.
109
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A. Judge Posner’s Majority Opinion
1.

Primary vs. Secondary Liability

Breaking with the theory of liability that had formed the basis of
the parties’ complaints and theories in the Boim litigation for
approximately eight years, Judge Posner, writing for the en banc
majority, first determined that § 2333 does not impose secondary
liability on donors or supporters of terrorism. 114 Thus, such individuals
or organizations could not be held liable for aiding and abetting an act
of international terrorism, as the district court and Seventh Circuit had
each twice held. 115 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Posner relied
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver. 116 Judge Posner stated that the Court
in Central Bank held that section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 did not provide for aiding and abetting liability “because
114

Boim III, 549 F.3d at 689. When the Boims initially filed their lawsuit, they
argued that § 2333 created primary liability, and that these particular defendants
themselves committed “an act of international terrorism.” Boim v. Quranic Literacy
Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (“According to plaintiffs’ theory,
sponsoring violence by providing money or other material support that facilitates the
recruiting and training of terrorists, enables the purchase of weapons or provides
‘compensation’ to the families of terrorists who die in the attacks—knowing that the
support will enable the terrorists to plan and carry out the bombing or shooting of
others—is an ‘activity’ that ‘involves violent acts’ that are a violation of federal law
and therefore meets the definition of ‘international terrorism’ in § 2331(1)(A).”).
Alternatively, they argued that § 2333 extends liability to aiders and abettors of
international terrorism, thereby creating secondary liability. Id.
115
See Boim, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (denying defendants’
motions to dismiss on the grounds that secondary—or aiding and abetting—liability
was viable basis for establishing liability under § 2333); Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000
(answering in the affirmative to the certified question on this issue); Boim v. Quranic
Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (granting summary judgment to
the Boims on the issue of aiding and abetting liability); Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 051816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 4 (7th Cir. 2007),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf. (reaffirming its holding in Boim
I on this issue).
116
511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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it makes no reference to secondary liability.” 117 According to Judge
Posner’s reading of Central Bank, “statutory silence on the subject of
secondary liability means there is none.” 118 Therefore, as with section
10(b), because § 2333 “does not mention aiders and abettors or other
secondary actors,” § 2333 does not—in fact, cannot—impose
secondary liability. 119
Despite this reading of Central Bank, Judge Posner concluded that
§ 2333 imposes primary liability on donors and supporters of
terrorism—ensuring that such donors would not escape liability. 120
Judge Posner described this “alternative and more promising ground”
for holding donors liable under § 2333 as one involving “a chain of
explicit statutory incorporations by reference.” 121 The first link in this
chain is the statutory definition of international terrorism found in
§ 2331(1). 122 Applying that definition, the central question becomes:
does providing financial support to a terrorist organization constitute
“activities that. . .involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human
life”? 123 Although Judge Posner seemingly determined that this
conduct by no means involved a “violent act,” he concluded that
“[g]iving money to Hamas, like giving a loaded gun to a child. . ., is an
117

Boim III, 549 F.3d at 689 (citing Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164).
Id.
119
See id.
120
See id. at 690.
121
Id.
122
Id. For § 2331(1)’s full definition of “international terrorism,” see supra
text accompanying note 33.
123
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2006); see Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690. Although there
are three sub-parts to § 2331(1)’s definition of “international terrorism,” the
defendants never disputed that their alleged conduct satisfied sub-sections (B) and
(C). See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1012 n.7 (N.D. Ill.
2001). One might question this decision, however. Surely, sub-section (C) is
satisfied (activities that “transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by
which they are accomplished”), but the defendants would have had at least a decent
argument as to (B) (activities that “appear to be intended. . .to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population” or “affect the conduct of a government. . .”). That is, it is at least
debatable whether, to the objective observer, giving money even directly to Hamas
“appears to be intended” to do any of the listed actions.
118
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‘act dangerous to human life.’” 124 Consequently, the first link to
liability was in place.
The second link in the chain is § 2339A, 125 because the conduct at
issue must not only involve a violent act or an act dangerous to human
life, but must also be a “violation of the criminal laws of the United
States.” 126 Section 2339A provides that an individual or organization
that “provides material support or resources [to terrorists]. . ., knowing
or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying
out, a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2332],” is guilty of a federal crime. 127
The third link in the chain is thus § 2332, which “criminalizes the
killing . . . , conspiring to kill, or inflicting bodily injury on, any
American citizen outside the United States.” 128 Accordingly, the entire
“chain of incorporations by reference” was connected, and Judge
Posner had established that individuals or organizations who provide
financial support to terrorists can be held primarily liable under § 2333
through the § 2331(1)–§ 2339A–§ 2332 chain of liability. 129
It was at this point where Judge Posner discussed defendant
Salah’s liability. Judge Posner determined that Salah could not have
rendered material support to Hamas between the 1994 effective date of
§ 2339A (the second link in the chain) and David Boim’s killing in
1996, because he was in an Israeli prison from 1993 until 1997. 130
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment
against Salah. 131 However, Judge Posner noted that most future cases
will not likely be affected by this timing issue, because they will rarely
involve donations or other material support that ceased before 1994, as
was the case with Salah. 132
124

Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)).
Id.
126
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A).
127
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006).
128
Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2006)).
129
See id.
130
See id. at 691.
131
Id.
132
Id.
125

393
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/6

22

Rowe: Ending Terrorism with Civil Remedies: <em>Boim v. Holy Land Found

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

2.

Volume 4, Issue 2

Spring 2009

Elements of Donor Liability Under § 2333

Judge Posner first explained that because § 2333 is a federal tort
statute, the traditional tort requirements of “fault, state of mind,
causation, and foreseeability” must be established; however, where, as
here, “the primary liability is that of someone who aids someone else,
so that functionally the primary violator is an aider and abettor or other
secondary actor, a different set of principles comes into play.” 133
Furthermore, Judge Posner concluded that § 2333 implicitly creates an
intentional tort, if for no other reason than because it provides for an
automatic trebling of damages—and treble damages are punitive
damages, which are imposed only if the defendant engaged in
deliberate wrongdoing. 134 Therefore, proof of the so-called “state of
mind” requirement under § 2333 requires showing that the defendant
either “knows that the organization engages in [terrorist] acts or is
deliberately indifferent to whether it does or not, meaning that one
knows there is a substantial probability that the organization engages
in terrorism but one does not care.” 135
Furthermore, because § 2333 creates an intentional tort, a plaintiff
must prove that the actual defendant knew that the organization he
was supporting was, in fact, a terrorist organization; that is, it is
insufficient to prove that the average or reasonable person would have
realized this—because “[t]hat would just be negligence.” 136 Judge
133

Id. at 692.
Id.
135
Id. at 693 (emphasis added). According to Judge Posner, “deliberate
indifference” meets the required “deliberate wrongdoing” standard of an intentional
tort because deliberate indifference is “recklessness, and equivalent to recklessness is
wantonness,” which is equivalent to intentional misconduct. See id. Additionally,
Judge Posner referred to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states: “If the
actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from
his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to
produce the result.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
136
Boim III, 549 F.3d at 693.
134
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Posner further elaborated on the state of mind requirement by
discussing risk, in terms of probability and magnitude. 137 For instance,
“the greater the risk, the more obvious it will be to the risk taker,
enabling the trier of fact to infer the risk taker’s knowledge of the risk
with greater confidence. . .” 138 Moreover, even if the probability of
harm is not great, it will be deemed “reckless” if it is excessive—
meaning substantial, relative to its gratuitousness. 139 And, as the
Seventh Circuit had previously recognized, “‘an activity is reckless
when the potential harm that it creates. . .is wildly disproportionate to
any benefits that the activity might be expected to confer.’” 140
Judge Posner’s conclusion from all of this was that “[t]he mental
element required to fix liability on a donor to Hamas is therefore
present if the donor knows the character of that organization.” 141 In
other words, § 2333 does not require proof that the donor intended for
his contribution to a terrorist organization to be used for terrorism per
se. 142 Therefore, “[a]nyone who knowingly contributes to the
nonviolent wing of an organization that he knows to engage in
terrorism is knowingly contributing to the organization’s terrorist
activities.” 143 From this rule, it follows that there is no “charity
defense”; that is, an individual or organization cannot defend itself
from liability simply on the ground that it earmarked its donation for
humanitarian, charitable, or other non-terrorist activities. 144 From
Judge Posner’s point of view, allowing “benign intent” to be a defense

137

See id. at 694–95.
Id. at 694.
139
Id. at 695.
140
Id. (quoting United States v. Boyd, 475 F.3d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 2007)).
141
Id. Of course, one would assume from Judge Posner’s lengthy explanation
that by “knows,” Judge Posner actually means “knows or is deliberately indifferent
to.” See id. at 693; supra text accompanying note 135.
142
See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 698–99.
143
Id. at 698.
144
See id.
138
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would practically “eliminate donor liability except in cases in which
the donor was foolish enough to admit his true intent.” 145
Additionally, Judge Posner cited two other reasons for not
requiring proof that the donor intended for his contribution to be used
for terrorism per se. First, because money is fungible, there is no way
to prevent organizations like Hamas from using money donated for
non-terrorism purposes in carrying out its terrorist missions. 146
Second, “Hamas’ social welfare activities reinforce its terrorist
activities,” both directly (for example, by providing financial
assistance to the families of killed Hamas terrorists) and indirectly (for
example, by boosting its image and popularity among Palestinians
and, consequently, recruiting new generations of terrorists). 147
In discussing the next required element, causation, Judge Posner
illustrated multiple cases, examples, and hypotheticals to show that
traditional but-for causation is not necessary, although some proof of
causation is nonetheless required. 148 Judge Posner began by discussing
the familiar multiple-fire example to explain that the defendant’s
tortious conduct need not have been a “necessary condition” (a but-for
cause) 149 of the resulting injury: “when two fires join and destroy the
plaintiff’s property and each one would have destroyed it by itself and
so was not a necessary condition. . .each of the firemakers (if
negligent) is [nevertheless] liable to the plaintiff for having ‘caused’
the injury.” 150 In this situation, neither defendant can escape liability

145

Id. at 698–99. Furthermore, such a defense “would also create a First
Amendment Catch-22, as the only basis for inferring intent would in the usual case
be a defendant’s public declarations of support for the use of violence to achieve
political ends.” Id. at 699.
146
Id. at 698.
147
Id. (citing Justin Magouirk, The Nefarious Helping Hand: Anti-Corruption
Campaigns, Social Service Provision, and Terrorism, 20 TERRORISM & POL.
VIOLENCE 356 (2008); Berman & Laitin, supra note 14, at 7–10).
148
See id. at 695–97.
149
See Maxwell v. KPMG, LLP, 520 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2008).
150
Boim III, 549 F.3d at 695 (citing Kingston v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 211
N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927)) (internal quotations omitted).
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by proving that he was not a but-for cause of the injury,151 because
each is nevertheless a sufficient condition of the resulting injury. 152
Furthermore, even where the plaintiff cannot adequately prove
which one of multiple defendants’ tortious conduct actually caused an
injury, causation can still be established to hold those multiple
defendants jointly and severally liable for the injury. 153 Judge Posner
also noted that an even more relaxed standard of causation can be
acceptable where the tortious acts of several defendants, in
conjunction, contributed to the plaintiff’s injury. 154 For instance,
multiple defendants are all liable if their tortious spilling of toxic
waste damages the plaintiff’s property, even if it is impossible to
determine which defendant actually caused the damage 155 —or even if
the amount of pollution spilled by each defendant would have been too
slight to have independently caused the damage. 156 In these situations,

151

See id. at 695–96 (citing Cook v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie
Ry., 74 N.W. 561, 564 (1898)); see also id. at 696 (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, 266–67 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]).
As Judge Posner noted, “[t]ort law rejects this conclusion for the practical reason
that tortious activity that produces harm would go unsanctioned otherwise.” Id. at
696.
152
See id. at 696 (“[T]he acts of each defendant are sufficient conditions of the
resulting injury, though they are not necessary conditions (that is, they are not butfor causes).”).
153
See id. As Judge Posner explained, this was the rule established in the
famous Summers v. Tice case,
where two hunters negligently shot their rifles at the same time and a third
hunter was hit by one of the bullets, [but] it could not be determined which
hunter’s gun the bullet had come from and so it could not be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that either of the shooters was the injurer in
either a sufficient-condition or a necessary-condition sense. . .Nevertheless
both defendants were held jointly and severally liable to the injured person.
Id. (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)).
154
See id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 696–97 (“Even if the amount of pollution caused by each party would
be too slight to warrant a finding that any one of them had created a
nuisance. . .‘[t]he single act itself becomes wrongful because it is done in the context
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a plaintiff must prove “only that there was a substantial probability”
that any of the defendants’ tortious conduct was a cause. 157 According
to Judge Posner, proof that a defendant “helped to create a danger” is
sufficient to hold him liable, and one who provides material support to
a wrongful act is held responsible as having committed the act. 158
Finally, as to proximate causation or “foreseeability,” Judge
Posner acknowledged that the majority’s framework may allow for the
imposition of liability on an organization that, for example, made a
contribution in 1995 to a terrorist group that killed an American
abroad fifty years later in 2045—as long as the donor had the required
state of mind. 159 Yet, to Judge Posner, imposing liability in this
situation “would not be as outlandish, given the character of terrorism,
as one might think.” 160
When applying all the possible theories of causation to the Boims’
case, Judge Posner noted that it is irrelevant that David’s death cannot
not be traced even indirectly to any particular defendant, because
“[t]he knowing contributors as a whole would have significantly
enhanced the risk of terrorist acts and thus the probability that [David]
would be a victim. . .” 161 It follows that this is true even if no single
defendant’s contribution was large enough to fund the particular attack
that led to his death. 162 Aside from this explanation, as well as a
discussion of evidentiary issues surrounding the plaintiffs’ proof that
Hamas was responsible for David Boim’s murder, 163 Judge Posner did
not address the application of the causation standard to the Boims’
case. Rather, in applying his established framework, Judge Posner
focused on the knowledge requirement, albeit only slightly more.
of what others are doing.’”) (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 151, at § 41,
268).
157
Id. at 697.
158
Id. (citing Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1958)).
159
Id. at 699–700.
160
Id. at 700.
161
Id. at 698.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 702–05. The evidentiary issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
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First, with respect to QLI, Judge Posner did not discuss how the
Boims proved QLI’s requisite knowledge, but merely said that the jury
was able to decide whether QLI had “knowingly provided material
support to Hamas,” and that the jury found QLI liable. 164 Second,
although AMS may have provided other types of material support to
Hamas, AMS’s only financial contributions were to HLF—not
Hamas. 165 Nevertheless, “the fact that [HLF] may not have known that
Hamas was a terrorist organization (implausible is that is) would not
exonerate [AMS],” because AMS apparently did know that Hamas
was a terrorist organization; 166 therefore, Judge Posner found that, by
giving money to HLF, AMS “was deliberately funneling money to
Hamas.” 167 Moreover, it was no defense that AMS did not directly
give material support to Hamas, but rather “launder[ed] donations
through a chain of intermediate organizations.” 168 To illustrate this
point, Judge Posner gave the following example: “Donor A gives to
innocent-appearing organization B which gives to innocent-appearing
organization C which gives to Hamas. As long as A either knows or is
reckless in failing to discover that donations to B end up with Hamas,
A is liable.” 169
Finally, Judge Posner explained that setting “the knowledge and
causal requirement” any higher than the majority had “would be to
invite money laundering, the proliferation of affiliated organizations,
and two-track terrorism (killing plus welfare). Donor liability would
be eviscerated, and the statute would be a dead letter.” 170

164

Id. at 702.
See id. at 701.
166
Judge Posner did not specifically explain how AMS satisfied the
“knowledge or deliberate indifference” state of mind requirement but merely stated
that “[t]he activities of [AMS] are discussed at length in the district court’s second
opinion.” Id. at 701 (citing Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885,
906–13 (N.D. Ill. 2004)).
167
Id.
168
Id. at 701–02.
169
Id. at 702.
170
Id.
165
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B. Judge Rovner’s Dissenting Opinion
1.

Primary vs. Secondary Liability

Judge Rovner concluded that what the defendants allegedly did in
this case is not clearly conduct that falls within § 2331(1)’s definition
of international terrorism and, thus, may not be a basis for primary
liability. 171 Although Judge Rovner agreed that the definition
“certainly is broad enough to reach beyond bomb-throwers and
shooters to include those who provide direct and intentional support to
terrorists,” she argues that “it is far from clear that sending money to a
Hamas-controlled charitable organization, for example, is on par with
that type of direct support for terrorism.” 172 Furthermore, Judge
Rovner agreed that donating to Hamas’s humanitarian wing may
indirectly aid terrorism by freeing up other Hamas funds to use for
terrorism or by boosting Hamas’s image among prospective terrorists
or other supporters. 173 For example, if Hamas’s humanitarian wing
receives more monetary donations than necessary to carry out its
social services programs, Hamas leaders can then spill over the extra
funds to augment its terrorist activities. 174 However, Judge Rovner
disagreed with Judge Posner’s conclusion that donations to Hamasaffiliated entities—including donations that are earmarked and used
for humanitarian purposes—can be characterized as “acts dangerous to
human life.” 175 Moreover, Judge Rovner believed that it is not
“evident (to say the least)” that providing money to “a Hamasaffiliated charity is an act that ‘appear[s] to be intended’ to have the
sorts of coercive or intimidating effects on government policy or upon
a civilian population as described in section 2331(1)(B).” 176
171

Id. at 708.
Id.
173
Id.
174
See id.
175
See id. at 690, 708.
176
Id. at 708–09. For the full text of § 2331(1), see supra text accompanying
note 33.
172
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Nevertheless, Judge Rovner concluded that the Boims could
attempt to hold these defendants liable under a secondary liability
theory. 177 To begin, Judge Rovner disagreed with the defendants and
Judge Posner that Central Bank precluded the Boims from proceeding
on an aiding and abetting theory simply because § 2333 does not
expressly provide for it. 178 As noted above, the Court in Central Bank
held that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting
action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
because that statute did not proscribe giving aid to someone who
violated the Act. 179 In particular, the Court stated that “there is no
general presumption” that a plaintiff may always sue both primary
actors and aiders and abettors under federal civil statutes. 180
Therefore, where Congress does not express any intent to extend
liability under a particular statute, a plaintiff may not sue those who
aid and abet violations of that statute. 181 Yet, at the same time, Judge
Rovner did not read Central Bank as eliminating aiding and abetting
liability in all federal civil cases except when the relevant statute
contain the words “aid and abet.” 182
In Judge Rovner’s view, there are four reasons why Central Bank
is not determinative in deciding whether § 2333 provides for
secondary liability. First, the issue in Central Bank was whether
liability under an implied right of action could be extended to aiders
177

Id. at 709 (“The secondary liability framework is a much more natural fit
for what the defendants here are alleged to have done. . .”). This was also the
conclusion of Judges Wood and Evans, the two other members of the panel in Boim I
and Boim II, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002); Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 051822, at 4 (7th Cir. 2007), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf., as
well as Judge Williams, who joined Judge Rovner’s dissent in Boim III, 549 F.3d at
705. Although Judge Evans dissented in Boim II, he did not do so on the issue of
primary versus secondary liability. See Boim II, at 94.
178
See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)).
179
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177–78; see supra note 117 and accompanying
text.
180
Id. at 182.
181
See id. at 183.
182
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019.
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and abettors, whereas § 2333 provides an express right of action. 183
Second, Congress did express an intent in the language and legislative
history of § 2333 “to import general tort law principles, and those
principles include aiding and abetting liability.” 184 Third, Congress
expressed its intention in § 2333 “to render civil liability at least as
extensive as criminal liability, 185 and criminal liability attaches to
aiders and abettors of terrorism.” 186 Fourth, failing to extend liability
under § 2333 to aiders and abettors “is contrary to Congress’ stated
purpose of cutting off the flow of money to terrorists at every point
along the chain of causation.” 187 Therefore, even though § 2333 does
not contain the words “aid and abet,” it nevertheless extends liability
to aiders and abettors, because the language, context, and legislative
history of § 2333 indicate that Congress intended the statute to “extend
183

Id. Judge Rovner noted that, because the courts already had to infer an
intent by Congress to create a private right of action under § 10(b), they were
reluctant to “pile inference upon inference” to extend liability to aiders and abettors.
Id. However, “no such stacking is required in section 2333.” Id.
184
Id.; see, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S4511-04 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1991).
185
Judge Rovner points out that § 2331(1)’s definition of “international
terrorism” includes activities that “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States. . .” Boim I, 291
F.3d at 1020 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2006)). Thus, “by incorporating
violations of any criminal laws that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human
life, Congress was expressly including aiding and abetting to the extent that aiding
and abetting ‘involves’ violence.” Id.
186
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (imposing criminal liability on
“whoever. . .aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures. . .” the
commission of a federal crime)). Since 18 U.S.C. § 2332 makes it a federal crime to
commit an act of terrorism, 18 U.S.C. § 2 therefore makes it illegal to aid and abet an
act of terrorism.
187
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019; see id. at 1020 (citing SENATE REPORT, supra
note 36, at 22); id. at 1021 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994)) (“[P]olicy considerations may be
used to interpret the text and structure of a statute when a literal reading would lead
to a result so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it.”); id. (“Also, and
perhaps more importantly, there would not be a trigger to pull or a bomb to blow up
without the resources to acquire such tools of terrorism and to bankroll the persons
who actually commit the violence.”).
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liability to all points along the causal chain of terrorism.” 188
Consequently, the class of possible defendants under § 2333 includes
both primary and secondary actors, and aiders and abettors of
terrorism can be held liable to the same extent as the terrorists
themselves. 189
2.

Elements of Donor Liability Under § 2333

To successfully hold donors to terrorism liable under a § 2333
secondary liability theory, a plaintiff must adequately prove the
elements of aiding and abetting liability, as well as the traditional tort
requirements of actual causation and proximate causation. 190
According to Judge Rovner, there are three aiding and abetting
elements applicable to § 2333 cases: the defendant (1) knew about the
terrorist organization’s illegal activities, (2) intended to help those
illegal activities succeed, and (3) engaged in some act of helping those
activities succeed. 191 According to Judge Rovner, requiring proof that
the defendant specifically intended to further the terrorists’ illegal
activities would allow the court to distinguish between the truly
culpable and the innocent. 192 Yet, Judge Rovner seemingly recognized
the difficulty that plaintiffs would likely encounter when trying to
prove such intent with direct evidence; thus, under Judge Rovner’s
framework, a plaintiff can prove the requisite intent with
circumstantial evidence, allowing the fact finder to infer a defendant’s
intent to further terrorist activities.193

188

Id. at 1019–20.
See Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 712 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d at
1016–21).
190
See id.; Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 48, 59, 60–
61 (7th Cir. 2007), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.; Boim I, 291
F.3d at 1010.
191
Boim II, at 48; Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023 (citing United States v. Zafiro, 945
F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1991)).
192
See id.
193
See id.
189
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For instance, a donation to Hamas, which has been a crime ever
since Hamas was designated as a foreign terrorist organization in
1997, would constitute “prima facie proof of one’s intent to further
terrorism.” 194 The same would be true if a defendant donated to a
charitable organization that serves as a front for Hamas or any other
terrorist group, or that has known ties to such a group. 195 Alternatively,
if a defendant merely donated money to a hospital controlled by
Hamas but which otherwise lacks ties to terrorist activities, and if the
defendant did so with the intention of funding that hospital’s medical
services, the fact finder “would be free to conclude that the donor had
a benign intent and did not aid or abet Hamas’s terrorism even if, in
the abstract, one might believe that furthering Hamas’s humanitarian
activity enhances its image and thereby supports its violent
activities.” 196
In addition to evidence of financial contributions, Judge Rovner
seems to believe that plaintiffs could also circumstantially prove
purposeful intent with other types of evidence. For instance, the
district court on summary judgment found the following as sufficient
evidence of AMS’s intent to help—and its acts of helping—Hamas’s
illegal activities succeed: (1) AMS representatives participated in a
meeting, attended by Hamas officials, during which the attendees
discussed ways to continue to support Hamas; (2) AMS contributed
money to HLF and routinely encouraged others to do the same; (3)
AMS published and distributed pro-Hamas documents, one of which
included an editorial advocating “martyrdom” operations; (4) AMS
tried to rally public support for individuals with ties to Hamas, such as
Salah, when they were arrested for or charged with supporting
terrorism; and (5) AMS invited pro-Hamas speakers to participate in
its annual conferences, once of which featured a veiled Hamas terrorist
as a guest speaker. 197
194

Id.
See id.
196
Id.
197
Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 50–51 (7th Cir.
2007), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf..
195
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Although Judge Rovner disagreed with Judge Posner and the en
banc majority as to whether § 2333 creates primary or secondary
liability, and as to what level of knowledge or intent the defendant
must be shown to have had, Judge Rovner most passionately dissented
because of Judge Posner’s application of the causation standards. 198
Specifically, Judge Rovner believed that Judge Posner’s framework
not only relaxed “the basic tort requirement that causation be proven,”
but actually eliminated it altogether. 199 In Judge Rovner’s view, it was
not “that the plaintiffs were unable to show causation,” but “rather that
they did not even make an attempt;” and, it was for that reason that the
Boim II panel decided to remand the case. 200
To hold a defendant liable under Judge Rovner’s § 2333
framework, a plaintiff must prove causation by a preponderance of the
evidence. 201 Of course, plaintiffs in typical tort cases must show “a
causal link between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s
injury.” 202 However, because these types of defendants are only
secondary actors, Judge Rovner explained at length in the Boim II
opinion exactly what causation means in this context, 203 including a
review of extensive precedent where a sufficient causal link was found
between the secondary actor’s conduct and the resulting injury. 204
Perhaps most importantly, requiring proof of causation does not mean
that, in the Boims’ case, they must “link specific donations or other
acts of support to David Boim’s murder in particular”; 205 rather, the
plaintiffs must provide sufficient evidence “that the defendants’
conduct caused terrorist activity that included the shooting of
198

See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705.
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.; Boim II, at 59, 63.
202
See Boim II, at 59.
203
See id. at 62–72.
204
See id. at 66–72.
205
Boim III, 549 F.3d at 709–10 (citing Boim II, at 63) (“Nothing in Boim I
demands that the plaintiffs establish a direct link between the defendants’ donations
(or other conduct) and David Boim’s murder—that they funded in particular the
terrorists who killed David Boim, for example. . .”).
199
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David.” 206 Furthermore, a defendant’s conduct need not have been the
sole cause of the plaintiff’s injury; instead, “it is enough that it be a
cause of the [terrorist] act and the resulting harm.” 207 Because these
rules are somewhat vague, however, Judge Rovner illustrated five
ways in which plaintiffs could successfully prove causation. 208
First, the plaintiff could certainly prove causation by establishing
a direct causal link between the defendants’ acts and the plaintiff’s
actual injury—here, David Boim’s death. 209 Judge Rovner noted that
the Boims proposed such a theory in Boim I, “theorizing that the
defendants had channeled funds into a central pool of money that was
used to train terrorists, buy their weapons, and so forth—and that the
terrorists who killed David Boim had been trained and armed using
those funds.” 210 But, again, such direct evidence is not required to
prove actual causation, because the fact finder could reasonably
concluded that a defendant’s material support to a terrorist
organization is “as essential in bringing about the organization’s
terrorist acts as those who plan and carry out those acts.” 211 Therefore,
a second method of proving causation could include the defendant’s
statements that he had provided funds to a terrorist organization to
purchase weapons and had otherwise supported the organization by
training terrorists. 212 In fact, the Boims pointed to one of Salah’s
206

Boim II, at 63; see Boim III, 549 F.3d at 710 (insisting that the plaintiffs
establish “proof that the types of support the defendants were alleged to have given
Hamas were, in fact, a cause of Hamas’s terrorism”).
207
Boim II, at 64 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. c
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; id. at cmt.
l; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 135, at § 430 cmts. d, e). In other words,
Judge Rovner’s view is that the defendant’s act need not be a but-for cause (or a
“necessary condition”), but merely a sufficient condition or “substantial factor,” of
the plaintiff’s injury. See id. at 60 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), § 26 (“Factual
Cause”); id. at § 26 cmt. b (but-for causation) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
135, at § 9 cmt. b (“substantial factor”)).
208
See id. at 62–65.
209
Id. at 62.
210
Id.
211
Id. (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002)).
212
See id. at 63.
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statements in which he made these specific claims. 213 This would
prove causation because the fact finder could reasonably conclude a
subsequent terrorist attack—and the resulting injuries—“were in part
caused by Salah’s actions, even if Salah had no role in planning and
executing a particular terrorist act.” 214
A third example would be proof that the defendant established a
network in the United States for the purpose of providing ongoing
financial support for Hamas’s terrorist activities. In that situation, the
fact finder could reasonably infer that establishing this type of network
caused subsequent Hamas terrorist acts, “even if no line could be
drawn linking a particular dollar raised to a particular terrorist act.” 215
Fourth, even if a defendant contributed solely to a terrorist
organization’s humanitarian or charitable arms, this could suffice to
establish an inference of causation if the plaintiff proved that, in doing
so, the defendant freed up the terrorist organization’s resources and,
thus, enabled more funds to be put toward the organization’s terrorist
activities. 216 Moreover, it is possible that even “relatively minor
financial contributions to terrorists or other minor acts of support
would be sufficient” to establish causation.” 217
Finally, under Judge Rovner’s approach, a plaintiff must prove
that the injury was a proximate cause of the tortious conduct or, in
other words, that it was foreseeable to the defendant. 218 Not only is
213

Id. (citing Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 899 (N.D.
Ill. 2004)) (noting that the Boims identified an August 1995 statement in which
Salah wrote that, “in the early 1990s, he had helped to test and train terrorists,
funneled money to Hamas for the purchase of weapons, and had coordinated with
other Hamas leaders in rebuilding Hamas’s infrastructure and command”).
214
Id.
215
Id. at 63–64.
216
Id. at 64–65.
217
Id. at 66. This is true because, according to Judge Rovner, “the conduct
need only be one of the causes,” yet need not be “the predominant or primary cause
of the injury.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207 § 26 cmts. c, j, & l;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 135, § 430 cmts. d & e).
218
See id. at 57. In her dissent, Judge Wood notes that the term “proximate
causation” is “imprecise at best,” as pointed out in the Proposed Final Draft to the
Restatement (Third) of Torts. Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 724 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing
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foreseeability a required element to prove any tort, but, according to
Judge Rovner, it is also explicitly required under § 2333 because that
statute provides a private right of action to a person who is injured “by
reason of” an act of international terrorism. 219 A defendant will
generally only be liable for injuries that would have reasonably been
seen as a “natural consequence” of his actions. 220 In this context, the
plaintiff must at least show that murder was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of providing funds or other material support. 221
According to Judge Rovner, if the plaintiff could prove this—along
with the three aiding and abetting elements, 222 as well as a causal link
between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury 223 —the
plaintiff would be able to establish that the defendant was liable for a
violation of § 2333.
IV. THE PROPER FRAMEWORK OF LIABILITY UNDER § 2333
A thorough analysis of both Judge Posner’s majority opinion and
Judge Rovner’s dissenting opinion reveals that neither judge’s
framework provides the most legally sound standard for liability. By
addressing the infirmities of both opinions, this Part develops a more
grounded framework for other courts to apply when presented with
§ 2333 donor liability cases.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207, at ch. 6, (Special Note on Proximate
Cause)). Instead, the Restatement (Third) refers to this concept as “scope of
liability,” recognizing that, “[a]t some point, the harm is simply too remote from the
original tortious act to justify holding the actor responsible for it.” Id.
219
Id.; see Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Holmes v. Sec.
Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992)) (“[T]he statute itself requires that in order
to recover, a plaintiff must be injured ‘by reason of’ an act of international terrorism.
The Supreme Court has interpreted identical language to require a showing of
proximate cause.”).
220
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1012.
221
Boim II, at 57 (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1012) (emphasis omitted).
222
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
223
See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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A. Primary and Secondary Liability
As it turns out, both primary and secondary liability theories are
available to plaintiffs bringing claims against donors under § 2333.
First, a primary liability theory is available, though not for the reasons
Judge Posner provided when laying out the so-called “chain of explicit
statutory incorporations by reference.” 224 Judge Posner determined
that the defendants’ conduct satisfies § 2331’s definition of
international terrorism by concluding that donating money to Hamas—
or even to Hamas’s humanitarian wing or a purported Hamas-affiliated
charity—is an act dangerous to human life. 225 This is extremely
problematic. What Judge Posner deems a foregone conclusion was in
fact rejected by Judge Rovner 226 and the district court, 227 as well as
the United States as amicus curiae in Boim III. 228 The literal act of
transferring money to Hamas does not endanger human life
whatsoever; rather, the result of giving money to Hamas may be
violent terrorist activities which, in turn, result in the endangerment of
human life.
Despite the fact that primary liability is not available for the
reasons set forth by Judge Posner, it is nevertheless a viable theory.
Under a primary liability theory, a plaintiff must show that he (or his
heir) was injured or killed by reason of a crime that constitutes an act
of international terrorism committed by the defendant. 229 As Judge
Rovner and other courts have recognized, actions giving rise to

224

See Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2008).
See id.
226
See id. at 708.
227
See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1015 (N.D. Ill.
2001).
228
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27–28 & n.6, Boim v. Holy
Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 05-1815, 051816, 05-1821, 05-1822).
229
See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d
571, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
225
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criminal liability under §§ 2339A and 2339B 230 can serve as the basis
for civil liability under § 2333, because §§ 2339A and 2339B elucidate
conduct prohibited under § 2333 by providing examples of what
constitutes an act of international terrorism. 231 Put another way,
Congress’s subsequent enactment of §§ 2339A and 2339B confirmed
and clarified that providing material support to terrorists or designated
foreign terrorist organizations is itself an act of international
terrorism. 232 Therefore, if a plaintiff can establish a violation of either
§ 2339A or § 2339B, he can satisfy the first element of a § 2333 claim:
an act of international terrorism. 233
In addition, contrary to Judge Posner’s conclusion, a plaintiff in
this type of case may proceed on a theory of secondary liability. As
recognized by Judge Rovner, 234 the United States as amicus curiae in
Boim I and Boim III, 235 and various other courts, 236 Central Bank is
distinguishable and thus not a bar to aiding and abetting liability under
§ 2333. Moreover, the Court in Central Bank did not hold that
secondary liability is available only if the statute explicitly provides

230

For the relevant language of these criminal provisions, see supra text
accompanying notes 40 and 42.
231
See Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1014–16 (7th Cir. 2002); Linde, 384 F. Supp.
2d at 581 (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1014–15); Boim, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1016
(holding that providing material support or resources for terrorism constitutes an act
of international terrorism under § 2333).
232
See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1014–16; Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
233
The same holds true regarding a violation of § 2339C. See Linde, 384 F.
Supp. 2d at 582.
234
See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019; supra text accompanying notes 183–87.
235
See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1017; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Affirmance at 21, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th
Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-1969, 01-1970); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
5, 11, Boim, 549 F.3d 685 (Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822).
236
See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2006);
Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 583; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 WL
319887 at *16 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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for it. 237 Rather, Central Bank stands for the proposition that there is
simply no presumption that aiding and abetting is always available in
all federal civil statutes. 238 Consequently, the court must determine on
a case-by-case basis whether the text and history of a particular statute
extends liability to aiders and abettors. 239
When looking at the language, context, and history of § 2333, it
becomes quite clear that Congress intended to create secondary
liability. First, although Congress exempted certain parties from
liability—such as the United States and foreign states 240 —Congress
did not address or restrict the liability of any other type of
defendant. 241 Second, the legislative history of § 2333 illustrates that
Congress was specifically looking to enable plaintiffs to sue not only
terrorists and terrorist organizations, but also those who aid in terrorist
activity. 242 Finally, Congress intended to incorporate common law tort
principles into § 2333, and such principles include attaching liability
to those who “make it possible for some actor grievously to injure
somebody else.” 243
237

See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (“To be sure, aiding and abetting a wrongdoer out to be
actionable in certain instances.”).
238
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 182; see Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1018.
239
See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1018; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
at 5, Boim, 549 F.3d 685 (Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822).
240
See 18 U.S.C. § 2337 (2006).
241
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6–7, Boim, 549 F.3d
685 (Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822).
242
See id. at 10 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 36, at 22) (noting, for
example, that the Senate Report on § 2333(a) emphasized that the statute sought to
impose “liability at any point along the causal chain of terrorism” to “interrupt, or at
least imperil, the flow of money” to terrorists and terrorist organizations) (emphasis
added) (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 9 (quoting Senate Hearing, supra
note 33, at 126 (statement of Prof. Wendy Perdue)) (discussing questions raised at
the congressional hearings regarding whether the remedy would extend to “the
organizations, businesses, and nations who support, encourage, and supply
terrorists[,] who are likely to have reachable assets”) (internal quotations omitted).
243
Senate Hearing, supra note 33, at 136 (statement of Joseph Morris, General
Counsel, United States Information Agency).
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Nevertheless, although Judge Rovner was correct that § 2333
provides for secondary liability, she incorrectly enumerated the
elements required to prove civil aiding and abetting liability under
§ 2333. In Boim I, Judge Rovner concluded that proving that a
defendant aided and abetting an act of international terrorism would
require evidence that the defendant (1) knew of Hamas’s illegal
activities; (2) desired to help those activities succeed; and (3) engaged
in some act of helping the illegal activities. 244 However, when setting
forth this standard, Judge Rovner cited United States v. Zafiro—a
criminal aiding and abetting case. 245 Yet, less is required in terms of
the intent element to establish civil aiding and abetting liability. 246
Instead, as explained by other courts, as well as the United States as
amicus curiae in Boim III, the general standards for civil aiding and
abetting liability are summarized in Halberstam v. Welch, 247 which the
Supreme Court described as “a comprehensive opinion on the
subject.” 248
In Halberstam, the D.C. Circuit relied on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and an array of federal case law to develop a
comprehensive standard for civil aiding and abetting liability.249 In
244

See Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1023 (7th Cir. 2002); supra note 191 and
accompanying text.
245
See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023 (citing United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881,
887 (7th Cir. 1991)).
246
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Boim, 549 F.3d 685
(Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822). Furthermore, the United States noted
that “a heightened showing of intent” to further the primary actor’s illegal goals (as
would be required under Judge Rovner’s aiding and abetting formulation) “is not
always required for aiding/abetting liability even in the criminal context.” Id. (citing
United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 797–98 (7th Cir. 1985)).
247
See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2005);
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15–16, Boim, 549 F.3d 685 (Nos. 051815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822) (citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)).
248
Cent. Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 181 (1994).
249
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477–78 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 135, at § 876).
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doing so, the court held that civil aiding and abetting liability typically
rests upon proof of the following elements: “(1) the party whom the
defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2)
the defendant must generally be aware of his role as part of an overall
illegal or tortious activity at the time he provides assistance; [and] (3)
the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal
violation.” 250 As to the third element, the Halberstam court identified
six factors to determine whether the defendant’s assistance was
sufficiently substantial. 251 In addition, Halberstam required the
plaintiff’s injury to have been a “natural and foreseeable consequence”
of the activity that the defendant helped the principal undertake. 252
Despite Halberstam’s usefulness in understanding civil aiding and
abetting jurisprudence, it is nevertheless not the ideal standard to be
applied under § 2333 for two reasons. First, Halberstam set forth these
standards in the context of a negligence action. 253 Section 2333, in
contrast, creates an intentional tort. Therefore, as discussed in Part
IV.B, secondary liability under § 2333 is also dependent on proof of
some level of intent. Second, the Halberstam standard focuses
extensively on whether the defendant provided substantial assistance
to the primary actor. 254 In the context of § 2333, however, the financial
support provided by a defendant need not be “substantial” to qualify as
“material support,” because “even small donations made knowingly
250

Id. at 477.
Id. at 483–84. The D.C. Circuit took five of the factors from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and created a sixth factor. The five Restatement
factors are: (1) “the nature of the act encouraged;” (2) “the amount [and kind] of
assistance given;” (3) “the defendant’s absence or presence at the time of the tort;”
(4) the defendant’s “relation to the tortious actor;” and (5) “the defendant’s state of
mind.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 135, at § 876, cmt. d). The
sixth factor added by the court is the duration of the assistance provided. Id. at 484.
252
Id. at 488.
253
The plaintiff in Halberstam, a widow, brought a wrongful death action
against a primary and a secondary actor. 705 F.2d at 474.
254
See id. at 478 (“Aiding and abetting focuses on whether a defendant
knowingly gave ‘substantial assistance’ to someone who performed wrongful
conduct. . .”).
251
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and intentionally 255 in support of terrorism may meet the standard for
civil liability under section 2333.” 256
For these reasons, a more appropriate civil aiding and abetting
standard under the § 2333 statutory scheme would synthesize the
appropriate elements propounded by Judge Rovner and the
Halberstam court. The first element would combine two related
concepts suggested by Judge Rovner and the Halberstam court and
would require proof that the defendant knew of the organization’s
illegal activities when it provided material support. 257 Second, the
plaintiff would need to prove that the defendant engaged in some act
of helping the organization’s illegal activities—an element advocated
by Judge Rovner 258 and which is based on one of the Halberstam
elements (but without the need for the assistance to have been
substantial). 259 Finally, the third element, taken from Halberstam,
would require proof that the party whom the defendant aided had
performed a tortious act that caused the relevant injury. 260 This three
element standard would be the most appropriate aiding and abetting
standard to use in § 2333 cases because it incorporates commonly
accepted civil aiding and abetting concepts while also taking into

255

See infra Part IV.B.
Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002); see Boim II, Nos. 05-1815,
05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 65 (7th Cir. 2007),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf. (highlighting the “possibility
that relatively modest financial contributions to terrorists or other minor acts of
support would be sufficient to render the donor liable for the injuries subsequently
inflicted by terrorists.”).
257
See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023 (citing United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881,
887 (7th Cir. 1991)) (requiring proof that the defendant “knew of Hamas’s illegal
activities”); Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477 (“[T]he defendant must generally be aware
of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time he provides
assistance.”).
258
See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023 (citing Zafiro, 945 F.2d at 887).
259
See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477 (“[T]he defendant must knowingly and
substantially assist the principal violation.”).
260
See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477 (“[T]he party whom the defendant aids
must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury.”).
256
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account what specifically is and is not required for liability under the
§ 2333 statutory scheme.
B. The Intent Requirement
In addition to proving the basic elements of primary liability
(which, in donor liability situations, requires proof that the defendant
violated §§ 2339A or 2339B) 261 or secondary liability (which would
require proof of the Judge Rovner-Halberstam synthesized
standard), 262 a plaintiff must also establish that the defendant acted
with some type of intent. This is so because, as all sitting judges on the
Seventh Circuit agree, § 2333 creates an intentional tort. 263 Judge
Posner concluded that the intentional tort state of mind element would
be satisfied here if the defendant knew that the donee organization
engages in terrorism or was deliberately indifferent to whether it does
so. 264 Judge Rovner incorporated the intent requirement through one
of the three elements which she claimed were required to prove aiding
and abetting liability—namely, that the defendant intended to further
the illegal goals of the donee organization. 265 An analysis of
intentional tort jurisprudence reveals that neither judge’s
conceptualization nor explanation of the intent element is completely
satisfactory, but that Judge Posner’s is the most accurate.

261

See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 257–60 and accompanying text.
263
See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 692 (majority opinion); id. at 720 (dissenting
opinion authored by Judge Wood and joined in relevant part by Judges Rovner and
Williams).
264
See id. at 693. Judge Posner later elaborates on this by quoting the
Restatement (Second): “‘If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or
substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the
law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.’” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 135, § 8A cmt. b).
265
See Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 48 (7th Cir.
2007), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.; Boim I, 291 F.3d at
1023; supra text accompanying note 191.
262
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Intent Means Purpose or Knowledge of a Substantial Certainty

The Restatement (Third) of Torts states that a person acts with
intent if he either acts (1) with the purpose of producing a particular
consequence or (2) “knowing that the consequence is substantially
certain to result.” 266 Additionally, the intent that must be shown is the
intent “to bring about the type of harm that the particular tort seeks to
prevent against.” 267 The type of harm that § 2333 seeks to prevent
against is the injuring or killing of a United States citizen by an act of
international terrorism. 268 Therefore, in § 2333 donor liability cases, a
plaintiff must prove that the donor either (1) acted with the purpose of
bringing about the injury or death of a United States citizen via an act
of international terrorism, or (2) acted despite knowing that the injury
or death of a United States citizen via an act of international terrorism
was substantially certain to result. 269
Although Judge Posner’s formulation of the state of mind element
approaches this widely accepted rule, 270 his wording misses the mark
somewhat. First, as just described, intent is not defined as knowledge
or deliberate difference (meaning not caring despite a substantial
probability)—as Judge Posner claimed. 271 Rather, intent is more
precisely defined as purpose or knowledge of a near certainty. 272
266

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207, at § 1; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 135, at § 8A (defining intent as a desire to cause the
consequences of the act, or a belief that “the consequences are substantially certain
to result from it”).
267
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207, at § 1, cmt b.
268
See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006).
269
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207, at § 1 & cmt b.
270
See, e.g., Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 369 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir.
2004) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d
1191, 1210 (9th Cir. 2003) (intentional interference of another’s interest in the use
and enjoyment of his land); ANR W. Coal Dev. Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 267
F.3d 957, 972 (8th Cir. 2002) (tortious interference with contract).
271
See Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2007); supra text accompanying
note 135.
272
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207, at § 1.
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Second, the consequence of the defendant’s intent is not that the
organization engages in terrorism—as Judge Posner stated 273 —
because that is not the type of harm that § 2333 seeks to prevent
against. Instead, the relevant consequence is the injuring or killing of a
United States citizen by an act of international terrorism. 274
Judge Rovner’s formulation of the intent element is likewise
inaccurate. By adopting a standard used for criminal aiding and
abetting liability, Judge Rovner required that the plaintiff prove that
the defendant acted with the purpose of furthering the donee
organization’s illegal goals. 275 However, as just described, that also is
not the proper formulation of the intent element. Moreover, Judge
Rovner’s explanations for why she believed a defendant can be held
liable only if he acted with specific intent or purpose are unavailing.
For instance, Judge Rovner claimed that requiring proof that the
defendant provided material support to further the terrorists’ illegal
activities “would serve to single out the most culpable of Hamas’s
financiers and other supporters by focusing on those who actually
mean to contribute to its terrorist program, as opposed to those who
may unwittingly aid Hamas’s terrorism by donating to its charitable
arm.” 276 Yet, courts and commentators across the country have
273

See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 693; supra text accompanying note 135.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
275
See Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 48 (7th Cir.
2007), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.; Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023
(citing United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1991)); supra text
accompanying note 191.
276
Boim III, 549 F.3d at 712. The second key reason Judge Rovner believed
the defendant must have acted with the goal of furthering the organization’s illegal
activities is because she thought any other level of intent would “pose[] a genuine
threat to First Amendment freedoms.” Id. at 706. In particular, Judge Rovner was
concerned with the idea of holding a defendant civilly liable for an organization’s
illegal activity based solely on his contributions if the donee organization also
engages in lawful activity. Id. at 713; see also id. at 713–15 (fully discussing her
First Amendment concerns). Although the First Amendment implications of the
intent requirement advocated in this Note are certainly important and worthy of
further development, the issue is beyond the scope of this Note. However, for a
general discussion of why Judge Rovner’s concerns are likely unwarranted, see
274
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recognized that a defendant who contributes to a terrorist
organization’s humanitarian wing is just as culpable as a defendant
who contributes directly to the organization with the purpose of
funding terrorism—because, among other reasons, augmenting
humanitarian-directed funds frees up money that can be used for
terrorist acts. 277 Although this may be seen as a harsh restriction,
Congress evidently saw it as necessary to effectively halt the financing
that is so critical to perpetuating terrorism. 278 And because requiring a
plaintiff to prove a defendant’s purposeful intent would likely thwart
Congress’s goal of eradicating terrorism by cutting off its vital

generally Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d en
banc, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding § 2339B against a First Amendment
challenge, despite its imposition of criminal liability without requiring an intent to
further a terrorist organization’s illegal goals); Jeff Breinholt, Resolved, or Is It? The
First Amendment and Giving Money to Terrorists, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1273 (2008).
277
See, e.g., Reno, 205 F.3d at 1136 (“[A]ll material support given to such
organizations aids their unlawful goals. . .More fundamentally, money is fungible;
giving support intended to aid an organization’s peaceful activities frees up resources
that can be used for terrorist acts.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 1134 (“Material support
given to a terrorist organization can be used to promote the organization’s unlawful
activities, regardless of donor intent. Once the support is given, the donor has no
control over how it is used.”); Angela A. Barkin, Comment, Corporate America—
Making a Killing: An Analysis of Why It Is Important to Hold American
Corporations Who Fund Terrorist Organizations Liable for Aiding and Abetting
Terrorism, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 169, 185 (2003); see also, e.g., Boim III, 549 F.3d at
698 (“But if you give money to an organization that you know to be engaged in
terrorism, the fact that you earmark it for the organization’s nonterrorist activities
does not get you off the liability hook.”); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d
571, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134).
278
See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134,
1146 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d, Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916
(9th Cir. 2009) (noting that Congress rejected the extensive objections made during
the hearings on § 2339B, a violation of which does not require an intent to further
any illegal activity, and that it in fact “made a specific finding [in § 2339B] that
‘foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal
conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.’”)
(citation omitted).
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financial lifelines, that standard simply cannot be required under
§ 2333. 279
There are several reasons why Judge Rovner’s purposeful intent
standard cannot be the correct requirement under § 2333. First, if
Judge Rovner’s purposeful intent requirement were adopted, there are
many situations in which a defendant’s act of donating to Hamas or a
Hamas-affiliated charity would subject him to criminal liability, but
not civil liability. 280 For instance, an organization could be found
guilty under § 2339B for donating to Hamas’s humanitarian wing even
if it merely knew that Hamas engages in terrorism; 281 but, under Judge
Rovner’s framework, a private plaintiff could not recover damages for
the same act unless the plaintiff could prove that the organization
donated with the purpose of furthering Hamas’s illegal activities. Yet,
in almost every other area of law, criminal liability is imposed only for
more egregious conduct. 282 Second, Judge Rovner herself pointed out
that “Congress expressed an intent in section 2333 to render civil
liability at least as extensive as criminal liability,” 283 and, in fact, that
“Congress intended for civil liability for financing terrorism to sweep
more broadly than the conduct described in sections 2339A and
2339B.” 284 Therefore, because the idea of requiring a defendant to
have acted with purposeful intent as a prerequisite to civil—but not
criminal—liability is contradictory to established jurisprudence and
Congressional intent, it is clear that § 2333 liability cannot be based
upon proof of such a specific intent. 285

279

See Barkin, supra note 277, at 186.
See Recent Case, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th
Cir. 2002), 116 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718 (2002).
281
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
282
See Recent Case, supra note 280, at 718.
283
Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002).
284
Id. at 1015 (emphasis added).
285
See Barkin, supra note 277, at 185.
280
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Application of the Intent Requirement

Of course, as with the majority of the Boims’ case, difficultly
arises when determining exactly how a plaintiff would go about
proving the requisite level of intent. To begin, however, the first
meaning of intent—that the defendant acted with the purpose of
bringing about the result—can essentially be eliminated from
discussion. As Judge Posner noted, no donor would be “foolish
enough to admit his true intent.” 286 Therefore, although in some cases
it may be possible to produce evidence that a defendant acted with the
purpose of bringing about this particular result, its probable rarity
renders it a less useful discussion.
With regard to the second meaning of intent, however, Judge
Posner stated that a plaintiff would be able to satisfy the intent element
by showing that the donor defendant knows the character of the donee
organization. 287 Despite Judge Posner’s somewhat imprecise
description of the relevant intent rules, 288 his application appears to be
proper. 289 According to Judge Posner, the Boims could have proved—
and, in his opinion, did prove—that the QLI and AMS had the
requisite level of intent because they knew the nature of the
organizations to which they donated. 290 In other words, a plaintiff
could hold a defendant liable with evidence that the defendant
knowingly “contributed to a group engaged in the open and regular
pursuit of violence,” 291 because knowledge of the organization’s
character certainly would have caused the defendant to know that, by
286

Boim III, 549 F.3d at 699.
See id. at 695; supra text accompanying note 141.
288
See supra notes 271–74 and accompanying text.
289
See Brief for the 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Supporting Affirmance of the District Court’s Decision Below
at 7, Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822) [hereinafter Brief for the 9/11 Families
United to Bankrupt Terrorism].
290
See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 701–02.
291
See Brief for the 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism, supra note
289, at 7.
287
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providing material support, it was substantially certain that a United
States citizen would be injured or killed by the donee’s violent acts.
In terms of proof, the plaintiffs could rely on circumstantial
evidence to allow the fact finder to infer that the defendant had the
requisite type of knowledge of the donee organization. 292 For instance,
in Boim, the plaintiffs presented evidence that AMS rallied public
support for individuals with ties to Hamas, such as Salah, when they
were arrested for or charged with supporting terrorism. 293 While such
support is certainly not illegal, and although a defendant could not be
held liable under § 2333 solely for engaging in such support, 294 it does
help create a basis for inferring that AMS knew that Hamas engages in
terrorism. 295 Additionally, in future cases, knowledge of the donee
organization’s character can be inferred somewhat easily because
many or most terrorist organizations (including Hamas) are now
officially designated by the U.S. government as a Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTO). 296 Thus, everyone is on constructive notice that
these organizations engage in international terrorist activities which
may injure or kill a United States citizen. 297 In the Boims’ case,
however, Hamas had not been designated as an FTO until 1997 298 —
after David was killed and, thus, after the relevant donations were

292

See supra text accompanying note 197.
Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 51 (7th Cir. 2007),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf..
294
See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 700; Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1023 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982)).
295
See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 911 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
296
As Judge Rovner noted, a donation to Hamas or any other designated FTO
after its designation in 1997 could serve as prima facie proof of even one’s
purposeful intent to further terrorism, Boim III, 549 F.3d at 712, and thus could also
create an inference of the lesser level of intent.
297
See Breinholt, supra note 276, at 1288.
298
See Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1002 n.2 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006)); supra
note 16.
293
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made. Therefore, in the Boims’ case, more traditional circumstantial
evidence would be necessary. 299
An additional hurdle to overcome in the Boims’ case is the fact
that the defendants often did not donate directly to Hamas, 300 and,
thus, inferring the defendants’ knowledge of Hamas’s character would
be insufficient to satisfy the intent element. Rather, some of the
recipient organizations were Hamas-controlled charitable
organizations or were otherwise connected with the humanitarian wing
of Hamas. 301 Even if this is true, however, Judge Posner stated that
“[a]nyone who knowingly contributes to the nonviolent wing of an
organization that he knows to engage in terrorism is knowingly
contributing to the organization’s terrorist activities.” 302 Again,
although his use of the term “knowledge” is somewhat off-target,
Judge Posner aptly clarified that donating to an intermediary does not
automatically relieve the defendant of liability simply because the
intermediary does not engage in violent acts itself. Therefore, it can be
said that a defendant has the requisite level of intent even if he
provides material support to a nonviolent intermediary organization, as
long as the defendant knew that the intermediary organization had a
substantial connection to a violent organization, such as Hamas. This
would allow the fact finder to conclude that the defendant provided
material support to the intermediary with knowledge of a near
certainty that it would result in the injury or death of a United States
citizen by an act of international terrorism.

299

But see Exec. Order 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079, 5081 (Jan 25, 1995)
(prohibiting the provision of funds to Hamas as of January 25, 1995); Brief for the
9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism, supra note 289, at 7–8 (noting that
Hamas’s reputation as a lethal terrorist organization preceded its official designation
by several years” and that, based on media coverage, “donors were on notice of
Hamas’s commitment to suicide bombings” even as of April 1994).
300
See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 706.
301
Id.
302
Id. at 698.
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C. Causation & Proximate Causation
Finally, under either a primary or secondary liability theory, and in
addition to some level of intent, a plaintiff must also prove the other
elements of an intentional tort—namely, causation and proximate
causation.
Judge Rovner’s heated attack on Judge Posner’s causation
analysis 303 made it appear as though she vehemently disagreed with
the causation rules that he reviewed. However, the standards laid out
by Judge Rovner for proving causation are quite similar to those
described by Judge Posner. For instance, both judges agreed that
proving traditional but-for causation is not necessary, 304 and that the
Boims did not need to prove that the defendants’ material support was
somehow used to facilitate the specific attack that killed David
Boim. 305 Similarly, both judges agreed that the Boims would not need
to prove that each defendant was the sole or principal cause of
Hamas’s terrorist activity in general, but rather that they must at least
prove that the defendant was “part of the causal chain that indirectly
facilitated Hamas’s terrorist activities.” 306 For the reasons set forth by
both judges, it appears as though these causation principles are
fundamentally sound, and should be applied to § 2333 cases.
As with the intent element, the application of the causation
standard to the Boims’ case illustrates the complexity of these cases,
and it was also seemingly the main reason Judge Rovner felt that
Judge Posner had eliminated the requirement of proving causation.307
In Judge Rovner’s opinion, the Boims had not yet proven causation,
and therefore, if for no other reason, she believed the case should have
303

See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705, 709–10; supra notes 198–200.
See id. at 695; Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 64
(7th Cir. 2007), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf..
305
See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 695; id. at 709–10 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
306
Matthew T. Glavin, Combating Terrorism: Will Civil Penalties Help Win
the War on Terror?, 14 PUB. INT. L. REP. 99, 101 (2008); see Boim III, 549 F.3d at
695–97; Boim II, at 64–66, 71.
307
See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705.
304
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been remanded. 308 In fact, at oral argument and in their briefs for the
Boim II appeal, the Boims’ counsel acknowledged that they did not
even attempt to prove causation 309 —because they (correctly) thought
that but-for causation did not have to be proven in an aiding and
abetting case, and because they (mistakenly) thought Boim I had only
required them to prove proximate causation. 310 However, as both
Judge Posner and Judge Rovner pointed out, although traditional butfor causation is not a necessary element in an aiding and abetting case,
some sort of legal causation must still be established—in addition to
proximate causation. 311
Under the proper causation standard, a plaintiff would have to
prove that the recipient of the defendant’s material support was
“sufficiently affiliated with” the terrorist organization, such that the
material support “indirectly supported [the organization’s] terrorist
mission.” 312 As this applies to the Boims’ case, it would require proof
that “QLI’s and AMS’s actions amounted to at least a sufficient cause
of the terrorist act that killed David Boim, even if, on [the] facts, there
were multiple such causes.” 313 In her opinion in Boim II, Judge
Rovner detailed numerous similar cases where this type of causation
standard was utilized. 314 The fact that plaintiffs were able to prove
causation under the standard set forth in these cases shows that
requiring plaintiffs to prove causation is not unduly burdensome;
308

Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705.
See Brief of Appellee, supra note 30, at 23–24 (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d
1000, 1011–12) (7th Cir. 2002)) (arguing that Boim I held that § 2333’s “by reason
of” language only required them to prove proximate causation); Audio recording:
Oral Argument (Part 2) for Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., Nos. 051815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822 (7th Cir. 2007) (Nov. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/MN0S7YW6.mp3 (argument of Nathan Lewin,
counsel for Stanley and Joyce Boim).
310
See Boim II, at 73.
311
See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 695–97; Boim II, at 710–11).
312
Boim III, 549 F.3d at 724 (Wood, J., dissenting).
313
Id. at 723; see also Boim II, at 65 (requiring “some evidence of a causal link
between a defendant’s conduct” and the type of attack that killed David Boim).
314
See Boim II, at 66–72; supra note 204 and accompanying text.
309

424
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009

53

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 6

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 2

Spring 2009

rather, Judge Rovner’s causation requirement is “sufficiently flexible
to account for the reality that a terrorist act may have many causes
without abandoning the longstanding tort requirement that an act have
some factual nexus with the plaintiff’s injury before it may be deemed
a basis for liability.” 315
Finally, with regard to proximate causation, the proper standard is
merely that the plaintiff’s injury or death was a “natural and
foreseeable consequence” of providing the material support.316 Judge
Posner correctly pointed out that, in § 2333 cases, this standard would
allow for the imposition of liability even a significant number of years
after the actual support was given. 317 While this rule seems somewhat
atypical, it makes sense, given the nature of terrorism. 318 This is
because if a defendant provides material support to an organization,
with knowledge of a substantial certainty that it will result in the
injuring or killing of a United States citizen by an act of international
terrorism, it simply does not matter if the act of terrorism leading to an
American’s injury or death occurs fifty years after the donation. It is
true that, “as the temporal or factual chain between the tortious act and
the harm becomes ever longer, the likelihood of intervening or
superseding causes becomes greater”; 319 however, even if the donated
money is never actually used to carry out an act of terrorism, the
donor’s money or other material support could be used to keep the
terrorist organization afloat, enabling it to continue to exist even fifty
years later and, thus, enabling the terrorist act to occur 320 . Therefore,
because the injury or death of an American citizen by an act of
international terrorism is certainly a “natural and foreseeable
consequence” of providing material support to an organization
315

Boim II, at 72.
See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also
Boim II, at 61–62.
317
See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 699–700; supra text accompanying note 159.
318
See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 700.
319
Id. at 724 (Wood, J., dissenting).
320
Id. at 700 (majority opinion) (“Seed money for terrorism can sprout acts of
violence long after the investment.”).
316
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involved in terrorism 321 —even fifty years later—the proximate
causation requirement likely will not present a significant obstacle to
liability in § 2333 cases.
In sum, the most appropriate framework for holding a donor liable
under § 2333 would require a plaintiff to prove that:
(1) the defendant either
(a) violated §§ 2339A or 2339B (primary liability); or
(b) (i) knew of the organization’s illegal activities when it
provided material support; (ii) engaged in some act of helping the
organization’s illegal activities; and (iii) aided a principal who
performed a tortious act that caused the relevant injury;
(2) the defendant either
(a) acted with the purpose of bringing about the injury or
death of a United States citizen via an act of international terrorism; or
(b) acted despite knowing that the injury or death of a United
States citizen via an act of international terrorism was substantially
certain to result;
(3) the recipient of the defendant’s material support was
sufficiently affiliated with a terrorist organization, such that the
material support indirectly supported the terrorist organization’s
violent goals; and
(4) the plaintiff’s injury or death was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of providing support.
CONCLUSION
As terrorism continues throughout the world, so too will grieving
families’ use of § 2333. Following in the Boims’ footsteps, other
families will use § 2333 both to seek justice for their loved ones killed
by senseless terrorist acts, and to bankrupt the financiers who enable
such violence. Because other courts will look to the Boim decisions as
the “critical authority” on § 2333, 322 it was vital for the Seventh
Circuit to employ the most legally sound standards when deciding
321
322

See id. at 694.
Brief of Appellee, supra note 30, at 17.
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Boim III. Unfortunately, although the court likely reached the correct
result in Boim III, neither Judge Posner’s nor Judge Rovner’s
framework incorporated the correct standard for each essential element
of § 2333. The framework advocated in this Note, however, seeks to
strike the delicate balance between following the traditional principles
of tort law and fulfilling the purpose of § 2333.
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